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The Aesthetics of Religious Freedom 
Benjamin L. Berger* 
The scope and nature of religious freedom is a matter of aesthetics.  This is not to 
claim that all questions of religious establishment and religious liberty can be reduced solely 
to aesthetic considerations.  Rather, this claim is intended to identify an under-examined and 
yet elemental component of what conditions and shapes religious freedom in contemporary 
liberal constitutional orders.  The influence of aesthetics on religious freedom may not 
always be determinative but it will never be absent.  Yet the role of aesthetics in structuring 
both the doctrine and lived realities of the constitutional protection of religion in modern 
societies has gone without critical comment in the growing literature on secularism and 
religious freedom in the modern rule of law.  The purpose of this piece is to explore the 
extent to which aesthetic commitments influence the manner in which religion is imagined 
and dealt with by the law.  Religious diversity, multiculturalism, tolerance, and 
accommodation are all subject, I will argue, to the force of law’s aesthetics.  My claim is that 
institutional responses to religious difference are predicated on aesthetic reactions, reactions 
that will anchor the terms on which religious communities will either find acceptance within 
the legal order or will find themselves in seemingly intractable conflict with the law. 
Raising the issue of aesthetics is to gesture to a nest of possible topics.  A substantial 
body of work has considered law and aesthetics from the more colloquial or conventional 
understanding of aesthetics as the study of the artistic or of judgments about the beautiful.1  
Under the rubric of “aesthetics” others yet have considered the relationship between legal 
imagery or art and the authority of law.2  Indeed, we are currently faced with a number of 
questions involving the relationship between law and religion that seem to turn on aesthetics 
in this more conventional sense of “image” or “representation”, including the French ban on 
“conspicuous religious symbols” or the Canadian debate over the niqab and law’s desire to 
see the face of the witness. 
Although important and interesting, these issues and analyses engage a very 
different, and less basic, sense of the aesthetic than this piece invokes.   When one turns back 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  Many thanks to John Borrows,
Hamar Foster, and the participants in the Varieties of Religious Establishment workshop held at St. Thomas 
University in Fredericton, New Brunswick, in November 2010, for their valuable comments on earlier 
versions of this chapter.  Thank you also to Hannah Askew and Jessica Gagne for their outstanding research 
assistance. 
1 Daniel J Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law: An Essay on Blackstone's Commentaries 
(Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973); Adam Geary, Law and Aesthetics (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001). 
2 Costas Douzinas & Lynda Neal, Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of 
Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Costas Douzinas, Shaun McVeigh & Ronnie Warrington, 
"The Alta(E)Rs of Law: The Judgement of Legal Aesthetics" (1992) 9:4 Theory, Culture & Society 93. 
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to its etymological roots,3 the word “aesthetic” refers to the basic elements of sense or 
perception.  This is the meaning of aesthetics that Kant used in his discussion of the 
transcendental aesthetic in The Critique of Pure Reason4 and it is precisely this aspect of 
Kant’s thought that offers the conceptual vocabulary that frames this chapter.  Famously, 
Kant argued that  
In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to 
objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it 
immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition.  To this as the 
indispensable groundwork, all thought points.5  
Whatever conceptions or structures of thought might inform human reason and analysis, for 
Kant the starting point had to be the recognition that our sense of objects – phenomena – 
are given to us in the frame of intuitions.  Certain of those intuitions, Kant argued, were 
empirical in nature, arising as they did from our engagement with specific objects in the 
world.  But even these sensations must come to us arranged in some form, subject to some 
structure of reception.  And so something in our minds must pre-exist our engagement with 
and sensations of a given object, something capable of giving form and order to these 
experiences of phenomena: 
And accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of 
sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the 
phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations.  This 
pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition.6 
As distinct from our empirical intuitions, which arise from our sensation of phenomena, pure 
intuition is that set of sensibilities that exist in advance of our perception of a given object, 
providing the basic framing of our reception of the world and, thereby, serving as what Kant 
called “principles of knowledge a priori”.7  All thought would be grounded in these basic 
intuitions and the study of these most basic intuitions Kant called “transcendental aesthetic.” 
The “aesthetic”, here, is that basic frame or architecture of thought and reflection and Kant 
held that “there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori, 
3 Pierre Schlag makes a similar move in his piece, Pierre Schlag, "The Aesthetics of American 
Law" (2002) 115:4 Harvard Law Review 1047 at 150.  
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason1781). 
5 Ibid at 23. 
6 Ibid at 23. 
7 Ibid at 24. 
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namely, space and time.”8  For Kant, space and time – the essential aesthetic ingredients – 
are the conditions under which all of our intuitions take place.   
Although he took Kant in a cultural and symbolic turn, Ernst Cassirer nevertheless 
confirmed this aesthetic primacy of notions of time and space, arguing that “[s]pace and time 
are the framework in which all reality is concerned.  We cannot,” he argued, “conceive any 
real thing except under the conditions of space and time.”9  Cassirer’s project was developing 
a philosophy of human culture by exposing its “architectural structure”,10 and an exploration 
of the formative aesthetic categories of space and time would prove indispensible: “To 
describe and analyze the specific character which space and time assume in human experience 
is one of the most appealing and important tasks of an anthropological philosophy”.11   
If we understand the constitutional rule of law as one way of encountering the 
world, as one system of symbols and meanings that comprise “a way of being in the world”12 
– as, following Cassirer, a cultural form13 – then an analysis of the culture of law’s rule
should explore its aesthetics of time and space.14  No exploration of the culture of law’s rule 
can dispense with an exploration of the shape of these basic frames for perception.  In many 
respects one comes to the study of religion far more accepting of the claim that 
understanding a given religious culture will depend at some basic and indispensible level on 
wrestling with its framing intuitions about space and time.  Yet as awkward as such questions 
might feel in the academic traditions of the study of law, they are no less central.  And when 
one is specifically concerned with the cross-cultural encounter between the constitutional 
rule of law and diverse religious cultures,15 I suggest that these questions are particularly 
salient.  
If intuitions frame our encounter with phenomena, and the basic form of intuition 
is the transcendental aesthetics, law’s encounter with religion and the resulting concepts and 
structures of thought about religious freedom will be conditioned by its basic intuitions – its 
8 Ibid at 24. 
9 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1944) at 42. 
10 Ibid at 36. 
11 Ibid at 42. 
12 Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1999) at 36. 
13 See also Benjamin L. Berger, "Law's Religion: Rendering Culture" (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 277; Desmond Manderson, Songs without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and Justice (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000) at 201: “Law is a cultural medium of epxressisve form, through which 
senses and symbols are combined, communicated, and interpreted.”  
14 Paul Kahn has provided an account of Law’s Time and Law’s Space in The Cultural Study of 
Law. Many of his insights, particularly from the architectural components of his analysis (as opposed to his 
genealogy of law’s time and space), will inform this piece.  The focus of this chapter, however, is on the 
implications of such conceptions on our understanding of religious freedom.   
15 See Benjamin L. Berger, "The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance" (2008) 21:2 Can. J. L. & Jur. 
245. 
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unthought commitments – about time and space.  Without at all diminishing the 
importance of the conventionally analyzed sites of friction between law and religion – the 
particular demands of public reason, the hidden normative content of liberalism, the 
meaning of the “secular”, etc. – exploring the framing structures of legal thought and analysis 
seems essential to understanding the modern interaction between law and religion.  In a 
volume fundamentally interested in the manner in which religion is understood in 
contemporary legal frameworks, this chapter asks about the role of law’s aesthetics in shaping 
religious freedom.  Beneath the doctrine, subtending the jurisprudence, a priori assumptions 
about space and time have, I will argue, a formative impact on legal reactions to religious 
difference.  
Using Kant’s reflections on transcendental aesthetics as a touchstone for a piece that 
is centrally concerned with cultural and religious pluralism may be counter-intuitive. His 
reflections on spatial and temporal intuitions were in service of identifying universal 
structures of human perception.  To speak about varieties of framing intuitions about space 
and time operative in different cultural formations is perhaps, in this sense, in tension with 
Kant’s original project.16  His concept of the transcendental aesthetic nevertheless affords a 
uniquely convenient and illuminating vocabulary for exploring the framing intuitions that 
ground legal analysis; and more than this, the hope is to draw out and exploit this very 
tension between the universalism of the original concept and the pluralist uses to which it is 
being put in this chapter, thereby methodologically underscoring another theme in this 
chapter: that the close study of cultural and religious difference within the law frequently 
involves the realization that what we imagine to be universal, immutable, or natural is in fact 
surprisingly and challengingly plural.   
In what follows I will offer initial reflections about the peculiar intuitions or framing 
assumptions about space, and then time, that inform the culture of law’s rule, identifying 
ways in which each might have implications for the shape and nature of religious freedom 
and establishment.  In each section I will offer examples drawn from the Canadian law of 
religious freedom that suggests the potency of these basic intuitions and, with it, the 
potential importance of a study of the aesthetics of religious freedom.   
Space and the Aesthetics of Religious Freedom 
They thought they could go back 
to find the same marked squirrels 
nesting in the walnut trees 
16 I am aware of elements in the philosophical literature on Kant that suggests a more pluralist 
reading of his ethics.  See, e.g., Thomas E. Hill, "Kantian Pluralism" (1992) 102:4 Ethics 743 and Dermot 
Moran, "Hilary Putnam and Immanuel Kant: Two 'Internal Realists'?" (2000) 123:1 Synthese 65, in which 
Moran describes Hilary Putnam’s account of the “glimmerings of ‘conceptual relativity’ and ‘pluralism’” 
(83) in Kant’s ethical thought.   
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and that there would be some work  
to do, something useful 
and hard, and that they might please 
 
their own need to be doing.   
You know what they found.  They found 
themselves standing in your yard 
awed by the gladiolus 
and the absence of something  
they knew.  This had been free land, 
 
they said, but now it was yours 
who went in to call the law.17 
 
 The City of Outremont, a vibrant part of Montreal, is home to a large orthodox 
Jewish population.  On Shabbat, the weekly day of rest that is also holiest day of the year, a 
piece of Rabbinic wisdom rings in the ears of Orthodox Jews – “The Jews did not preserve 
the Shabbas; the Shabbas preserved the Jews.”  It is a day with deep temporal significance, 
marking off sacred time from the everyday business of the week, but the key admonition 
against work on Shabbat has profound implications for how orthodox Jews move in the 
world.  One can draw this sense of Shabbat being both a temporal and spatial event from the 
word used for observing Shabbat – one is shomer Shabbas.  “Shomer” comes from the root “to 
guard.”  One guards Shabbat.   
The home is the sacred space of Shabbat.  The injunction against work includes a 
prohibition on carrying items outside one’s home.  In a modern urban life, this prohibition 
poses certain serious limitations – one would be prevented from pushing a stroller, from 
carrying medication, or even from bringing keys outside the home in order to lock the door 
when one goes to synagogue on Shabbas or another Jewish holiday.   
 The eruv has served as the solution to this halachic (legal) conundrum.  The eruv is a 
barely visible wire erected in Jewish communities to symbolically extend the special space of 
the home across lanes and sidewalks, common areas, and public spaces, turning them into a 
metaphorical extension of the home.18  The space bounded by the eruv is transformed into 
part of one’s home, allowing movement through the community on the holy days.  The 
word eruv means “to mix or join”; the eruv mixes the home and the public, breaking down 
the distinction in service of sacrality and in recognition of the day of rest, a day that brings 
into each week the memory of the end of God’s creation of the world.   
                                                
17 Philip Levine, “Possession” in Not this pig; poems (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1968) at p 31.  
18 For a description of the technical features of the eruv, see Roger Stump, Geography of Religion: 
Faith, Place and Space (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), at 3.   
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 The City of Outremont began dismantling the system of eruvin in 2000, objecting 
to their presence across city streets and public spaces.  The City took these steps pursuant to 
its “duty to maintain the public domain accessible to all residents of Outremont on the same 
basis and without distinction.”19  One argument made by the parties supporting the removal 
of the eruvin was that “the erection of eruvin involuntarily place non-members of the 
Orthodox Jewish faith within what amounts to a religious enclave with which they do not 
wish to be associated.”20  To allow the eruvin “would inevitably create what amounts to an 
officially recognized religious territory”.21  A group of petitioners from the Jewish 
community sought relief from the Quebec Superior Court in 2001, claiming that the actions 
of the City interfered with their constitutionally protected right of religious freedom.  The 
Court found that the City had a supervening public authority to regulate the erection of the 
eruv but that this should be done in a way that gave reasonable room for the members of the 
religious community to observe their private commitments. 
 Some years before, also in Montreal, a number of Jewish members of a 
condominium association, the Syndicat Northcrest erected a temporary booth, called a succah, 
for the eight-day festival of Succot.  Jewish law and tradition requires that one eat meals and 
dwell as much as possible in the succah for the duration of this holiday.  The very basic 
structures, covered with foliage but open enough that one can see the stars at night, are 
reminders of the fragile homes in which Israelites lived as they made that most crucial of 
territorial journeys over the span of 40 years, from slavery in Egypt, to their homes in Eretz 
Israel, the land of Israel.  The succah is a compendious reminder of this journey, of the space 
of freedom, of the sacrality of home, and of the promise of a homeland. 
 A number of residents of the Syndicat Northcrest built their succahs on their 
balconies, considered common space under the condominium bylaws.  These bylaws 
prohibited alterations to the external appearance of the building and the erection of 
structures in the communal spaces of the condominium.  A negotiation between the Jewish 
residents and the building management ensued, with a compromise found for many of the 
residents – a single communal succah would be built on the grounds of the condominium.  
Certain of the residents could not agree to this, however, convinced as they were that they 
were each under an obligation to have a personal succah and unsatisfied with a common 
succah that would require them to carry items through common space during the holiday in 
order to use this structure.  Despite having signed the condominium bylaws when they 
purchased their units, Moïse Amselem and three other Jewish residents insisted on the 
religious freedom to build their own succahs on their balconies.  The case eventually found its 
way to the Supreme Court of Canada, where the Court held that, properly circumscribed, 
                                                
19 Rosenberg v. Outremont (City), [2001] R.J.Q. 1556 (S.C.) at para. 14. 
20 Ibid at para. 18. 
21 Ibid. 
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the applicants’ private religious beliefs could be accommodated within the regime of 
collective property rights.22 
 
*     *     * 
 
 When such events come before the bar of the law, to what spatial aesthetic are they 
subject?  The question matters because, as Kant and Cassirer suggest, space is one of those 
framing intuitions that conditions the manner in which a culture will receive and respond to 
phenomena.  The developing critical geographical literature has similarly emphasized the role 
of spatial understandings and metaphors as foundational aspects of how both individuals and 
cultures interpret and understand both their worlds and themselves.23  One can “see 
through” spatial metaphors and territorial conceptions, understanding them “as implicating 
and being implicated in ways of thinking, acting, and being in the world – ways of world-
making informed by beliefs, desires and culturally and historically contingent ways of 
knowing.”24  In this sense, these conceptions of space “are significant cultural artifacts of a 
rather special kind.”25  As Delaney writes, “[o]ne might go so far as to say that a cultural 
formation or social order is unintelligible without reference… to how it is territorially 
expressed.”26  As a particularly salient modern cultural formation, one should expect to find 
the liberal rule of law informed by and expressed in a sense of space and territoriality.  And as 
a component of the legal way of “world-making,” the imprint of this spatial logic will also be 
seen in the law’s treatment of religion and claims of religious freedom, an imprint that I am 
describing as one aspect of the aesthetics of religious freedom. 
 “Morality,” Kahn writes, “may be without borders, but law’s rule begins only with 
the imagination of jurisdiction.”27  Jurisdiction is the guiding metaphor for law’s 
understanding of space, serving as the conceptual means of “mapping” authorities within the 
legal world.  As Valverde puts it, “the governance of legal governance is the work of 
jurisdiction.”28  Although the concept of “jurisdiction” is not solely spatial – organizing, as it 
does, authority over objects, relationships, and topics – its function in organizing and 
interpreting territorial or spatial relations is what interests me here.  Jurisdiction is “a way of 
                                                
22 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551. 
23 David Delaney, Territory: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). See also Nicholas 
Blomley, Law, Space and the Geographies of Power (New York: Guilford Press, 1994); Wesley Pue, 
"Wrestling with Law: (Geographical) Specificity V. (Legal) Abstraction" (1990) 11 Urban Geography 566; 
Kai Raustiala, "The Geography of Justice" (2005) 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2501. 
24 Delaney, supra note 23 at 12. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at 10. 
27 Kahn, supra note 12 at 55. 
28 Mariana Valverde, "Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal 'Technicalities' as Resources for Theory" 
(2009) 18 Social & Legal Studies 139 at 141. 
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speaking and understanding the social world”,29 one that does so by charting the boundaries 
of the legitimate exercise of authority.  The experience of the social space of the law is one of 
moving within multiple domains of authority.  Space matters to the law precisely inasmuch 
as it is called upon to answer the question: “who has authority or jurisdiction here?”   
Some articulations of this jurisdictional way of organizing space closely mirror the 
cartographic.  National and international borders are emphatically and obviously a matter of 
territory and the reach of political authority.  These borders are not just (or even principally) 
physical; rather, they are aspects of the legal imagination that make territory as much an 
ethical as a geographical matter.  Cases concerning the extraterritorial reach of even our most 
fundamental legal principles – in Canada, the extraterritorial impact of the Charter30 – are 
such fraught questions precisely because the legal system is not solely a moral system but also 
a jurisdictionally-ordered social world.  The same play of space and authority can be seen in 
Canada’s internal federal organization.  The constitution (in all senses of the word) of the 
political community in Canada is based on the jurisdictional arrangement of competing legal 
authorities.  The great spatial question of federalism is whether a matter is intra vires a 
province or a matter of federal regulation.  Again, the lines on the political map of Canada 
are symbolic markers for the boundaries of legitimate authority.  This is not to say that these 
lines aren’t real; it is, instead, to emphasize that, as Ford puts it, “they are constantly being 
made real”31 through the range of practices of authority that take place within the culture of 
law’s rule.   
 Yet some the most influential aspects of the spatial intuitions of the law are not so 
literal, cartographic, and largely writ.  Indeed, as Delaney observes, “the micro-territories of 
everyday life may be more significant – or at least more noticeable, than the macro-territories 
of global politics”32 and the legal imagination has much to say about these “micro-
territories.”  Like all other territorial imaginations, legal space “is as much a metaphysical 
phenomenon as a material one”,33 implicating basic ontological questions that help to 
constitute political and social relations within the culture of law.  Perhaps the most potent 
example of this ontological and social work done by legal mappings of space is the law of 
property, one of the building blocks of western legal culture.  “Within the ongoing practice 
of law’s rule, any particular space appears first of all as property.”34  Property law is precisely 
the framing of space into competing authorities.  It involves the legal parcelling of authority 
over space and objects in space.  Whether one has a fee simple interest in land or merely a 
leasehold is a legal distinction about space that shapes one’s rights and entitlements within 
                                                
29 Richard T. Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)" (1999) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 843 at 
855. 
30 See, e.g., R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292; Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] 2 
S.C.R. 125. 
31 Ford, supra note 29 at 856. 
32 Delaney, supra note 23 at 5. 
33 Delaney, supra note 23 at 12. 
34 Kahn, supra note 12 at 63. 
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that sphere and, with this, one’s social relations with other subjects.  To interpret and 
negotiate space through the legal idea of property involves internalizing a particular range of 
power relations and distinctive ways of imagining the subject’s relationship to the world and 
to other subjects; this is one respect in which the law does not merely act upon the world 
but, rather, “makes the world, helping to constitute the understandings and beliefs that make 
the world unfold this way, rather than that way,” providing “hegemonic categories through 
which social life is ordered”.35  As scholars of Indigenous legal traditions have suggested, 
cultural understandings of space that differ from those found in the western legal tradition 
can engender very different social relations and political formations.36  The jurisdictions of 
everyday life created through the legal metaphysics of property are an important aspect of the 
way in which law, as a cultural formation, uses spatial and territorial conceptions to 
constitute a social and political world.   
 Within that social and political world constituted by the spatial intuitions of legal 
culture, the division of the world into private and public domains is of utmost importance.  
This distinction is, of course, “[o]ne of the most consequential of categorical boundaries 
relating to the spatial order of property”,37 dividing the world into two spheres of ownership: 
public and private.  Much ink has been spilled on the centrality of this division to the liberal 
rule of law and some of it has explored the way in which this manner of dividing up the 
world distorts or fails to reflect the experience of those subject to law’s rule.  Yet law’s fealty 
to a manageable and real distinction between the private and public is deep, an artefact of the 
contemporary constitutional rule of law’s relationship to liberal political culture; as Blomley 
puts it, this distinction is “one of the crucial axes of liberal legalism”.38  The personal or 
private is protected space, the space in which interest and preference can guide conduct and, 
most crucially, the space over which the state has the weakest claim to authority.  The public, 
by contrast, is the domain of state power and (concomitantly) governed by the demands of 
public reason over personal interest or preference.  The influence of this ontological 
distinction is felt throughout the culture of law’s rule, shaping constitutional principles as 
much as it does property relations.  One need go no further than the law of search and 
seizure to find a pristine expression of this way of carving up space; the state has a claim of 
authority over that which is left in public space or available for public observation entirely 
distinct from the privacy enjoyed in one’s personal space – be it the hyper-private space of 
                                                
35 Nicholas Blomley, "Flowers in the Bathtub: Boundary Crossings at the Public-Private Divide" 
(2005) 36 Geoforum 281 at 282. 
36 See, e.g., Paul Nadasdy, "'Property' and Aboriginal Land Claims in the Canadian Subarctic: 
Some Theoretical Considerations" (2002) 104 American Anthropologist 247; James (Sákéj) Youngblood 
Henderson, "Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness" (2002) 1 Indigenous Law Journal 1; John 
Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002), esp. ch. 2, “Living Between Water and Rocks: The Environment, First Nations, and 
Democracy”. 
37 Blomley, supra note 35 at 283. 
38 Blomley, supra note 35 at 283. 
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the body or the hallowed territory of the home.39  Even when it comes to the exercise of 
fundamental rights and freedoms not all space is treated equally.  The ambit of freedom of 
expression will differ vastly as between one’s home, a public school, a private school, a park, a 
legislature, and an airport.  These differences can all be traced to varying conceptions of the 
nature and locus of authority exercised in each of these spaces.  Otherwise put, when the 
expressive event appears before the law, it appears subject to and within a preconception of 
space in which the salient and instinctive question is “who has what legitimate authority in 
this space?”  The accretion of these private/public distinctions does more than just formal 
legal work; it provides “a pervasive vocabulary through which the socio-spatial world is 
rendered intelligible.”40  The resulting complex maps of private and public spaces, and their 
political and social implications, are an important part of the “micro-territories of everyday 
life”41 lived under the rule of law. 
 The argument of this piece is that the peculiar spatial intuitions in culture of the rule 
of law imprint on the management and analysis of issues of religious freedom.  In this way it 
is possible to speak of a spatial aesthetics of religious freedom.  In supporting this assertion, 
one temptation would be simply to invoke broad claims about the nature of space in religion 
and to show an inherent conflict between “religious ways” of imagining space and what I 
have thus far described about the law.  One might, for example, invoke Eliade and claim 
that, for religion, space is understood in terms of the sacred and the profane,42 a meaningful 
way of dividing up the world that is simply missed if law approaches space as a matter of 
jurisdictional authority.  It is no doubt true that many religions will find the sacred/profane 
division more true to their sense of movement through space.  Where this is so, there might 
be a fundamental misunderstanding when law and religion meet on a given issue that 
involves questions of space.  But this will not be true of all religions and such sweeping 
claims on the religious side are not, ultimately, terribly edifying. 
 My purpose is instead to suggest that that law of religious freedom has an aesthetic 
component that – quite apart from any particular doctrinal development or argument about 
the just in a given case – shapes the way in which such issues will be discussed and draws out 
particular terms as the salient terms for discussing freedom of religion.  One ignores law’s 
intuitions about space and jurisdiction at one’s peril when advancing or analyzing claims of 
religious freedom made within a liberal culture of law’s rule.  Consider the cases explored at 
the outset of this section.  The eruv was a problem for the law (and for the City of 
Outremont) because it sought to destabilize the border between the very private space of the 
                                                
39 See, e.g., R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, on the powers of the police to enter into a home; R. v. 
Patrick, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, on search, seizure and privacy rights on the borders between the home and 
public space. 
40 Blomley, supra note 35 at 284. 
41 Delaney, supra note 23 at 5. 
42 Mircea Eliade, Sacred and the Profane; the Nature of Religion (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., 1959). 
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home and public spaces subject to public authority.  In disrupting this border, the eruv also 
challenged the liberal commitment to confine religion to the private sphere, by symbolizing a 
spilling-over of private religion into public spaces.  In her assessment of debates about the 
eruv in one London neighbourhood, Davina Cooper traces community hostility to the fact 
that the eruv “flaunted minority beliefs, practices and loyalties in a way that provocatively 
disregarded the liberal public/private divide.”43  In transgressing the private/public border the 
eruv not only symbolically privatized public space, it “was seen… as also transgressing the 
divide by bringing inappropriate expressions of religious faith into the public domain.”44  
The eruv “mixed” or “joined” the public and the private and, in this sense, was “an affront to 
ontological ordering principles”.45  Within the range of distinctive religious beliefs and 
practices within this community, the eruv became a contested site precisely because it came 
into conflict with the law’s orienting spatial intuitions.  This is the aesthetics of religious 
freedom at play.  In this case, resolving the religious freedom question would require 
clarifying and redrawing the lines between private and public, the realm of government 
authority and that of religious expression.  The limit of a court’s ability to reconcile a 
religious practice within legal space is one boundary of religious freedom.   
 Amselem, the case regarding the erection of a succah on a condominium balcony 
discussed above,46 demonstrates a similar dynamic.  Quite simply, the matter would not have 
been of constitutional or legal moment were it not for the transgression of law’s spatial 
aesthetics.  Had Mr. Amselem enjoyed a fee simple property interest in his balcony, the 
matter would not appear as a question of religious freedom – there would have been no legal 
issue because Mr. Amslem’s religious expression would have conformed to the spatial 
categories imagined by the constitutional rule of law.  As a purely private expression, there 
would, in short, be no issue of religious freedom.  The fact that this space had a somewhat 
undefined public quality is what lent the erection of the succah spatial relevance for the law, 
creating a constitutional issue.  As with the eruv, the matter would turn on the Court’s 
ability to reconcile public (or “collective”) authority over this space with private interests; the 
case was ultimately about the management of spatial authority.  
 The case of Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 3647 is a final example of the 
imprint of these spatial framings on matters of religious freedom.  The case involved a school 
board’s decision, based on religious objections of parents in the community, to prohibit the 
use of three books depicting same-sex parented families for use in a Kindergarten/Grade One 
curriculum.  The Supreme Court of Canada quashed this decision on the grounds that the 
School Board had failed to comply with the admonition in the legislation that all public 
                                                
43 Davina Cooper, Governing out of Order: Space, Law and the Politics of Belonging (London and 
New York: Rivers Oram Press, 1998) at 141.   
44 Cooper, supra note 43 at 130. 
45 Blomley, supra note 35 at 284. 
46 Supra, note 22. 
47 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710. 
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schools must be administered on “strictly secular and non-sectarian principles.”48  This 
decision can be fruitfully analyzed as a case about the concept of the secular and the demands 
of public reason.49  Yet one might well understand the case in somewhat different terms: that 
prior to either of these questions, the issue engaged a spatial intuition suffusing the doctrines 
of religious freedom.  
 Recall that Kant’s interest in the transcendental aesthetics arose from the proposition 
that, prior to the development of further conceptions and propositions about phenomena, 
we had to receive or perceive these phenomena in an organizing structure.  Time and space 
were the constituent elements of this structure.  How, then, were the events in Chamberlain 
received by the law?  These phenomena appeared to the law within the grid of competing 
authorities that shapes its spatial intuitions.  At the core of the question of religious freedom 
raised by this case was the potent spatial fact that the events at issue were concerned with 
what happened in a public school.  Had the books been suggested for use in a family’s home, 
it would not appear as a legal event.  Had the books been banned for use in a religious 
school, the doctrinal shape of the questions asked about religious freedom would have been 
manifestly different.  This spatial distinction might not have mattered one whit to the 
religiously motivated participants in the discussion.  Indeed, the tensions and passions 
provoked by this case may well have been inflamed by the mismatch between the way in 
which space mattered for the law and its relevance – or lack thereof – for those arguing that 
the books ought to be banned.  Yet the spatial reception of these events – the aesthetics of 
religious freedom – set the frame of relevance and the terms for debate for this case.   
 
Time and the Aesthetics of Religious Freedom 
 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future, 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable.50 
 
 In 1763 the military hostilities between the British and French in what would later 
become Canada ceased with the signing of the Treaty of Paris.  That treaty guaranteed the 
right of Roman Catholics in French Canada to carry on the practice of their religion.  The 
Quebec Act of 1774, another crucial legal step in the development of the Canadian state, 
included similar provisions providing special protections and rights for the Roman Catholic 
Church.  With Confederation in 1867, the modern Canadian state took form.  The nation’s 
                                                
48 School Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, s. 76. 
49 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 13. 
50 T.S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton” in Four Quartets (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1971) at p. 
13.  
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first constitution, the British North America Act, provided for the basic structures of 
government in Canada, defining the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and instituted 
the particular brand of Canadian federalism with the division of legislative authority between 
the federal government and the provinces.  Also included in the BNA Act (which would later 
be renamed the Constitution Act, 1867) was s. 93, a provision that gave authority to the 
provinces to legislate in respect of education.  Yet this provision also carried forward the 
tradition of affording legally distinct status to religious education, reflecting the history of 
Protestant and Catholic minorities in French and English Canada, respectively, by protecting 
the rights and privileges of Protestant and Catholic minority schools. 
 In the mid-1980s the Ontario government sought to introduce a Bill providing for 
full funding of Roman Catholic separate high schools in Ontario.  Despite the recent 
introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Bill did not extend similar funding or 
protection to denominational schools of other traditions.  The constitutionality of this bill 
was put to the courts and one of the questions posed was whether the privileging of Roman 
Catholic schools was consistent with Charter protections of freedom of religion, which also 
prohibited state endorsement of religion,51 and the equality of treatment on grounds of 
religion.  The Supreme Court of Canada discussed the nature and import of s. 93 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, describing it as “part of a solemn pact resulting from the bargaining 
which made Confederation possible”.52  The Court explained that  
 
The protection of minority religious rights was a major preoccupation 
during the negotiations leading to Confederation because of the perceived 
danger of leaving the religious minorities in both Canada East and Canada 
West at the mercy of overwhelming majorities.53 
 
In spite of the apparent conflict between such specific protection of a given religion’s 
educational interests over those of others and the seeming awkwardness of holding this set of 
privileges together with the recently-affirmed Charter commitment to the equal treatment of 
religious groups, Justice Wilson, writing for a majority of the Court, held that this 
privileging of Roman Catholic education was immune from Charter scrutiny.  Section 93, 
“which represented a fundamental part of the Confederation compromise”54 was not subject 
to the claims of freedom of religion. 
 This matter came back before the Supreme Court when a group of Jewish parents 
and a group of non-Catholic Christian parents sought a declaration that the failure to 
provide funding for Jewish and other Christian schools directly offended their s. 15(1) 
equality rights and freedom of religion, guaranteed by s. 2(a) of the Charter.  Rather than 
                                                
51 R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
52 Reference Re Bill 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 at 1173. 
53 Ibid at 1173. 
54 Ibid at 1197-98. 
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seeking to declare the funding of Roman Catholic Schools in Ontario unconstitutional, these 
parents sought the expansion of the funding regime – equal funding of their schools, the 
litigants argued, would protect their religious freedom in the same manner as Roman 
Catholic education protected Catholicism in the Province.  The majority of the Court 
confirmed that s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, served “to entrench constitutionally a 
special status for such classes of persons, granting them rights which are denied to others.”55  
Yet when attention shifted to whether this offended the guarantee of freedom of religion, the 
Court again answered with an emphatic “no.”  “Without this ‘solemn pact’, this ‘cardinal 
term’ of Union, there would have been no Confederation,”56 Justice Iacobucci reasoned.  “As 
a child born of historical exigency, s. 93 does not represent a guarantee of fundamental 
freedoms”57 but, rather, was “the product of an historical compromise which was a crucial 
step along the road leading to Confederation.”58  This status immunized it from the logic of 
freedom of religion; s. 2(a) simply did not apply.  
 While this case was being decided in Canada, Mr. Arieh Hollis Waldman, the father 
of two Jewish children enrolled in a private day school in Ontario, brought a similar claim 
before the U.N. Human Rights Committee.59  He argued that Ontario’s policy of funding 
separate Roman Catholic Schools violated religious freedom and equality guarantees found 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  The tribunal took account of 
the reasoning in the Bill C-30 case and the Adler decision, noting the special constitutional 
status of Roman Catholic education reflected in s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  Yet it 
reasoned that “the fact that a distinction is enshrined in the Constitution does not render it 
reasonable and objective.”60 
In the instant case, the distinction was made in 1867 to protect the Roman 
Catholics in Ontario.  The material before the Committee does not show 
that members of the Roman Catholic community or any identifiable section 
of that community are now in a disadvantaged position compared to those 
members of the Jewish Community that wish to secure the education of 
their children in religious schools.  Accordingly, the Committee rejects the 
State party’s argument that the preferential treatment of Roman Catholic 
schools is nondiscriminatory because of its Constitutional obligation.61 
 
The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations found Canada in violation of Article 
26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
                                                
55 Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 at para. 25. 
56 Ibid at para. 29. 
57 Ibid at para. 30. 
58 Ibid at para. 29. 
59 Wadman v. Canada, HCROR, 76th Sess, Annex, Communication No 694/1996 (1996). 
60 Ibid at para. 10.4. 
61 Ibid.  
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*     *     * 
 
 Kant privileged time in his transcendental aesthetics, stating that “[i]n it alone is all 
reality of phenomena possible.”62  “Time,” wrote Kant, “is the formal condition a priori of all 
phenomena whatsoever.”63  If time is an a priori intuition that frames and gives form and 
order to all that is perceived, all sensation of or reflection on phenomena, can anything be 
said about the way in which distinctive framings of time condition the way that phenomena 
are understood and dealt with in the law?  In particular, are there any ways in which such 
framings might shape the management of issues of religious freedom and the limits of legal 
tolerations?  To identify such characteristics of time and temporality within the law would 
suggest another aspect of what we might call the aesthetics of religious freedom.  In what 
follows I want to gesture towards certain potential features of this temporal aesthetic. 
One way that temporality may come into the picture to shape and structure issues of 
religious freedom is at points of substantial divergence between religious conceptions of time 
and secular legal understandings.  To be sure, religion and the law may have fundamentally 
different framings of the relevance of time, a mismatch that can produce miscommunications 
that afflict the law of religious freedom.  In those cases one sees very clearly the import of 
accounting for a tacit temporal aesthetic in the law of religious freedom.  In such cases, the 
limits of religious accommodation may be traceable in certain instances to a basic aesthetic 
dissonance.  Consider the case of A.(C).  The case concerned an almost 15 year old girl 
suffering from Crohn’s disease.64  Although her medical advice was that she was in life-saving 
need of a blood transfusion, as a devout Jehovah’s Witness, she had signed an advance 
directive expressing her wish not to have such transfusions.  The Manitoba legislation 
presumed competence for those 16 years or older and provided that no medical procedure 
could be undertaken against these older children’s wishes unless this presumption was 
rebutted.  A.C. was assessed and all accepted that she was legally competent – she was, in 
essence, a mature minor.  Yet as a child under the age of 16, the legislation vested the 
treatment decision in a judge who was to balance a range of factors, ultimately issuing the 
order that comported with the best interests of the child.  A.C. challenged the legislation on 
the basis that, as a competent minor who had expressed her wish to follow the dictates of her 
religion, the legislative scheme violated a number of her rights, including her right to 
freedom of religion. 
The majority of the Court held that the legislation was constitutionally valid but 
ruled that her religious views ought to be given weight in the analysis of what is “in the best 
interests of the child” – the governing standard under the legislation.  Justice Binnie, 
                                                
62 Kant, supra note 4 at 26. 
63 Ibid at 27. 
64 A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181. 
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dissenting, would have found the legislation unconstitutional on the basis that, as a mature 
minor, she had the sole authority to make such decisions.  Justice Binnie’s judgment is a 
model of perspicuity and modesty in the law of religious freedom, noting as he did that 
“[i]ndividuals who do not subscribe to the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses find it difficult to 
understand their objection to the potentially lifesaving effects of a blood transfusion.”65  
Nevertheless, he concluded as follows: 
 
The Charter is not just about the freedom to make what most members of 
society would regard as the wise and correct choice.  If that were the case, 
the Charter would be superfluous.  The Charter, A.C. argues, gives her the 
freedom – in this case religious freedom – to refuse forced medical 
treatment, even where her life or death hangs in the balance.66 
 
Even with the greater constitutional margin that he affords for A.C.’s religious 
views, Justice Binnie’s decision discloses something important – indeed, indispensible – 
about the aesthetics of religious freedom.  For both the majority and the dissent, the 
argument was about autonomy in the present and the impact of past authority.  Despite 
their different conclusions, both decisions work within the temporal frame of the law, 
including the law of religious freedom.  What is never on the table – what could never be on 
the table in matters of religious freedom – is the way that time framed A.C.’s experiences and 
her perception of her world.  Her decision was made in the grip of a teleological sense that 
put the eternal welfare of her soul in the balance.  Yet her eschatological aesthetic, that which 
informed the exercise of the autonomy that the Court fixed upon, could not be understood 
within the constitutional rule of law.  Such sharp dissonances between religious and legal 
conceptions of time demonstrate one way in which religious freedom takes place within law’s 
aesthetic instincts.  However, I want to explore a more subtle way in which the distinctive 
temporality of legal culture influences the shape of religious freedom and, indeed, the range 
of secularisms that one finds in various communities.   
Legal time – time as worked with within the constitutional rule of law – is a 
compendious reception of all of those moments in the life of the community bound by law 
that might serve as authority for the present.  Kahn identifies the “historicity of law” as “its 
single most prominent feature”67 but he specifies the nature of this historicity: “Law’s rule 
carries forward a past that makes a meaningful claim upon us.”68  The student of the 
common law will find this feature in the basic principle of stare decisis as the building block 
                                                
65 Ibid at para. 191. 
66 Ibid at para. 163. 
67 Kahn, supra note 12 at 43. 
68 Ibid at 45. 
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of the legal rule: the starting point for legal authority is fidelity to the past.69  As Kahn 
astutely observes, “[l]egal arugments do not begin by asking about ‘the best outcome, all 
things considered.’  They begin from a commitment to the past.”70  This durable 
commitment to the past as the starting point for legal reasoning imprints itself on how law 
understands and interprets the social world.  Constitutions express this relationship between 
time and the rule of law, with the formative documents and events that express both the is 
and the ought of a community at one point in history carrying forward to make claims upon 
us in the present.71  To the extent that it makes a meaningful claim upon us today, this past 
both communicates and constitutes political identity.   
The most striking feature of law’s time is its synchronicity.  Like an individual’s life 
story, the historical narrative that frames law’s perception and reception of all events is the 
entirety of its past.  “At any given moment, the law appears as the sum total of all that has 
been done and not yet undone.”72  The past remains present in its claims of legal authority, 
producing “a curious kind of temporal flatness in the relationship of legal tests and resources 
to each other.”73  This “temporal flatness” inheres in the possibility that any legal event, any 
legal decision, may appear as influential in a given contemporary moment.  As Martin 
Krygier observes, “the past of law…is not simply part of its history; it is an authoritative part 
of its present.”74    We don’t know at any given point whether the best or most relevant 
authority on the rule of law will be a case decided in 200775 or one decided in 1959.76  Both 
reflect moments in the legal life of the community and, despite the half century separating 
them, neither is of greater or lesser authority.  Except in the most Whiggish of views, the law 
is not on an arc of progressive discovery, nor is it sequenced, with the past falling away into 
historical fact, making room for the authority of the present.  This is what I mean by law’s 
time as a compendious reception of all of those moments in the life of the community bound 
by law that might serve as authority for the present. 
Appreciating law’s time in this fashion raises an intriguing issue: can it even be said 
that law possesses a sense of “history”?  Considering the nature of history as a symbolic form 
in human life, Cassirer observed that, before it could be said that historical consciousness had 
                                                
69 For the centrality of tradition to the rule of law, see also Anthony Kronman, "Law as Precedent" 
(1990) 99 Yale L.J. 1029. 
70 Kahn, supra note 12 at 43.  See also Paul W. Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury V. Madison and 
the Construction of America (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997) at 19. (“A critical 
element in our belief in the rule of law is that the future of the political order should be the same as its past.  
Law's rule is an exercise in the maintenance of political meanings already achieved.  It links the future to the 
past....To abandon the problem of interpretation of meanings already present in the legal order, and to ask 
only how we can best order the future, is to abandon the rule of law.”). 
71 See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "The Idea of a Constitution" (1987) 37 J. Legal Educ. 167. 
72 Kahn, supra note 12 at 43. 
73 Ibid at 51. 
74 Martin Krygier, "Law as Tradition" (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 237 at 245.   
75 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873.  
76 Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121. 
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truly taken up residence in human culture, myth was the prevailing view of time.  “In myth,” 
Cassirer wrote, “we find the first attempts to ascertain a chronological order of things and 
events, to give a cosmology and a genealogy of gods and men.”77  But he goes on to explain 
that this cosmology and genealogy is not properly “history”, and his explanation reflects 
provocatively on my description of law’s time.  
 Cassirer distinguishes mythical time from historical time insofar as, in the former, 
“[t]he past, present, and future are still tied up together; they form an undifferentiated unity 
and an indiscriminate whole…. From the point of view of the mythical consciousness the 
past has never passed away; it is always here and now.”78  Historical consciousness, by 
contrast, is diachronic; for the historian, “facts belong to the past and the past is gone 
forever.”79  In this light, law’s synchronic time appears to be a kind of mythical time, rather 
than a brand of historical time.  The authoritative imminence of time past is part of a 
mythical vision in service of constructing a coherent national political story through law.  
Perhaps in this observation we find some account for the troubling ham-fistedness evinced 
by law when forced to deal with redress for historical injustice or, in Canada, claims to 
Indigenous title.  Despite professed attempts to take account of historical truth, the law 
always meets these compelling cases and claims in thrall to a mythic sense of time – the myth 
of the community as constituted by law – into which it awkwardly seeks to digest the facts of 
history.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in an early 19th century Indigenous land rights 
case is exemplary:  
 
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an 
inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been 
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been 
acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the 
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be 
questioned.80 
 
Whatever we learn about promises made and broken in the political history of the country, 
the law is insistent on a story whose moral is its own legitimacy. 
                                                
77 Cassirer, supra note 9 at 173. 
78 Ibid at 173. 
79 Ibid at 174. 
80 Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591, as cited in Eric 
Dannenmaier, "Beyond Indigenous Property Rights: Exploring the Emergence of a Distinctive Connection 
Doctrine" (2008) 86 Washington University L. Rev. 53.  Dannenmaier also points to the 1992 Australian 
High Court decision in Mabo v. Queensland, in which the tension between the facts of history and what must 
be assumed for the purposes of legal authority/sovereignty is clear on the face of the judgment.  See also Kent 
McNeil, "The Vulnerability of Indigenous Land Rights in Australia and Canada" (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 217. 
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The range of secularisms and varieties of religious establishment that one finds in 
modern western traditions are constituted in part by the force of these mythic stories carried 
through the authority of law.  With this tethering of authority and history, law’s time shapes 
the frame into which issues of religious and cultural difference are received, molding the 
sense of what is natural, possible, or unthinkable as a matter of religious freedom.  One sees 
the imprint of this approach to temporality very clearly in the religious education cases with 
which I began this section.  Claims of religious freedom had to be disposed of within the 
mythic time of law, in which the purchase of a “solemn pact” made in 1867, and its 
historical antecedents, was dispositive in a case heard in 1996, and despite the introduction 
of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  This legal event – the challenge to the Roman Catholic 
School funding scheme – came to the courts already conditioned by the mythic time 
defining the Canadian community under its rule of law.  The law of religious freedom could 
not be addressed outside of the frame of this temporal aesthetic, one in which the inter-
religious compact reached in the 18th and 19th centuries had as much authoritative purchase 
as the claims of religious equality in the modern secular state.  When the matter was freed 
from this temporal/mythic frame, when the matter was brought before the UN Committee 
on Human Rights in the Waldman case, the analysis and result were both manifestly 
different.  This is, perhaps, one way of understanding the claim that international law does 
not seem to be “law” in a conventional sense.  Law works by appealing to resources within 
the unfolding story of a particular community wrestling with justice issues over time.  
Without an “us” upon which past authority calls in a meaningful way, without a 
compendious mythical story of community, international law loses this feature of legal 
reasoning, appearing more aspirational than legal.  In Waldman the past authorities were not 
present in the same way, present as part of a temporal identity, and so the Committee could 
state that “the fact that a distinction is enshrined in the Constitution does not render it 
reasonable and objective.” Needs a citation. True, but prior to the question of reasonableness 
and objectivity is the question of the aesthetics of religious freedom: the shaping of the 
boundaries of religious freedom in light of the history of a given community.  There is an 
aesthetic intuition that informs religious freedom, imprinting on the varieties of religious 
establishment, of secularism, and of doctrines of religious freedom. 
 
Conclusion: The Indispensible Aesthetic Question 
In this chapter I have explored the idea that time and space are two intuitions of the 
culture of law’s rule that sit at the foundation of the law of religious freedom.  Appreciation 
for these aesthetic instincts is clearly not sufficient for understanding the legal response to 
deep religious difference.  There is an important structure built on top of these, and other, 
basic and tacit commitments, a structure of concepts, doctrines, rules and provisions that 
combine to produce a textured law of religious freedom.  But these frames, these aesthetic 
conditions, are never absent.  Analysis of the variety of forms of secularism, of religious 
freedom, and of religious establishment – or even reflection on a given claim of religious 
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freedom – will be impoverished if regard is not given to these conditioning intuitions in the 
culture of law’s rule.   
While seeking to expose the temporal and spatial components underwriting law’s 
approach to religious freedom, I have gestured to ways in which these intuitive structures 
might be filled with different content in a variety of national contexts.  Pursuing this line of 
inquiry may give traction to work exploring the range of ways that religious diversity and 
religious freedom appear in various societies around the world.   
With respect to the spatial, one can begin to see how, within the larger brush strokes 
that I have described, the local particulars of the way in which the complex map of authority 
is laid over legal space will affect doctrines of religious freedom.  In Canada, I invoked the 
role of federalism as an important experience in this division of authority; this genealogy of 
spatial authority in Canada points to certain resources for thinking about managing 
conflicting claims of authority.  The same is true of the Canadian experience of engagement 
with the Aboriginal peoples on this land, an experience in which competing sovereignties 
and the notion of treaty have played important roles.  And so, claims about managing 
religious diversity both drawing from and appealing to the spatial aesthetics of Canadian law 
begin to emerge.  We might find federalist concepts, including the hyper-legal concept of 
jurisdiction, offered as a resource for managing religious difference,81 or a concept of treaty 
constitutionalism developed as an approach to speaking justly about cultural difference.82 
Temporally, one might intuit a difference between revolutionary and evolutionary 
cultures of the constitutional rule of law.  As Kahn shows in his work, the moment of 
revolution – the resetting of the legal time frame to begin again – has a profound impact on 
the content of law’s mythic time, even its basic structure.  As we use genealogy to fill this 
structure we see how a similarly revolutionary constitution in which that moment of fissure 
had religious dimensions will set the “downstream” terms of religious freedom, as they have 
in France.  The evolutionary constitutional culture in Canada brings a host of compacts and 
compromises forward to shape religious freedom and religious establishment quite 
differently, as we have seen.  It is only with sensitivity to the basic temporal aesthetic of law’s 
rule – with the particular hold that the community’s mythic past has on what is just and 
right today – that the source and durability of these differences comes into clear view.   
When we ask what shape religious diversity under the rule of law will take in various 
societies or when we ask about how a given claim of religious freedom will be perceived and 
received in a given polity, it will never be enough to gesture broadly to the aesthetic 
foundations of law’s rule.  The inquiry will always have to be more specific, more fine-
grained.  If, however, one takes law to be a cultural form, one way of seeing and making 
sense of the world, then attention to these broad and basic facets of legal perception will 
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never be dispensable.  To ask about the varieties of religious establishment – indeed, to 
wonder about the possibilities open to us for responding to religious diversity through the 
law – requires first recognizing, and then wrestling with, the temporal and spatial aesthetics 
of religious freedom.   
